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interest in divested and she has apparently no right in the proceeds as
against her husband." J.W.L.
THE NATURE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS- ENFORCEMENT
BY COVENANTEE WHO No LONGER OwNs LAND
IN THE COMMUNITY
A recent Ohio decision' involves the nature of restrictive covenants
and the theories of their enforcement. A corner lot which had been
part of a testamentary estate was transferred by a deed containing a re-
strictive clause forbidding the use of the premises for other than residence
purposes. The restriction was stated to be for the benefit of certain
named devisees and also to and for the benefit of the present and future
owners of the real estate which the testator had owned on a particular
street. An owner of property on the adjoining street joined with one of
the named covenantees in seeking to enforce the covenant by injunc-
tion against a successor in title to the lot in question. Enforcement was
denied on the grounds that no one on the designated street was objecting
and that the covenantee who no longer owned land in the community
would not "benefit" from enforcement of the restriction.
The character of the remedy sought indicates that the theory of the
plaintiff's case was based on equity doctrines. A substantial reason for
appealing to equitable jurisdiction is the specific nature of the remedy
which equity affords. More often than not the party seeking to enforce
a restrictive covenant is more interested in insuring the continuance of
the limitation than in obtaining monetary compensation. Such a desire
has been especially evident in the field of building restrictions in the de-
velopment of residential subdivision plans and recourse to equity has been
most frequent in this area.
When there is an attempt to enforce covenants by and against suc-
cessors to the original covenating parties there are further advantages
in the equitable approach. Many of the strict and rigid requirements,2
like the necessity of privity, which were incident to the common law
devices of easements and real covenants are relaxed or avoided in equity.
The leading case' using the equity approach made the equitable doctrine
"o Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547, 67 Am. Dec. 355 (1856). Also see Long v.
Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N.E. 161, 5 A.L.R. 1343 (197o). Also see TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY, 7d ed., vol. 1, sec. 230, p. 8oi.
' Taylor v. Summit Post No. ig, American Legion, Inc., 6o Ohio App. 201, Z7 Ohio
L. Abs. 58z, 13 Ohio Op. 25, 20 N.E. (zd) 267 (938).
2Hurd v. Curtis, ig Pick. (Mass.) 459 (1837) 5 Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475,
97 Am. Dec. 633 (1869); Lingle Water Users' Assn v. Occidental Bldg and Loan Assn,
4.3 WyO. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931); note (1937) 4 O.S.L.J. 93; z TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY, (2d Ed., sgo) sec. .4 (d).
' Talk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. (Eng. Ch.) 774 (1848).
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of notice the basis for relief. The rule was said to be that a taker of land
with notice of a restriction upon it cannot in good conscience be permit-
ted to violate the terms of the limitation.
In the main, there are two principal theories as to the application of
this equitable doctrine. One view treats the restrictions as contracts
relating to the enjoyment of land; 4 the other treats them as creating
interests in the land itself,' substantially like easements at common law.
An attempt to make the result conform to one or the other of the
two theories may make a difference in the outcome in some situations.
If the contract theory is adopted, it does not afford a very satisfactory
explanation of the termination of the right by a change in the character
of the neighborhood. The property theory, however, can justify the
result as analogous to the doctrine of abandonment which was well de-
veloped for legal easements at the common law.'
Another instance where the result may be affected by the underlying
theory is on the question of whether compensation has to be given to
adjacent owners entitled to enforce the restrictions in cases where the
property subject to the restrictions is taken by eminent domain.7 The
contract theory easily explains a refusal of compensation by construing
the contract as one not binding upon the state in its sovereign capacity.
The equitable easement doctrine logically leads to a contrary result: that
the vested equitable interest in the land belonging to the owner of the
Az TIFFANY, op. cit., p. 14375 Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Stran-
gers to a Contract, IS Col. L. Rev. 291 (i918) and ig id. 177 (5959) discussing various
theories; AmEs, LEcTuREs oNe LEGAL HIsroRY, 381 (913)5 C. I. Giddings, Restrictions
on the Use of Land, S Harv. L. Rev. 274 (r892).
'Pound, Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (589z); A. W. Scott, The
Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 Col. L. Rev. 269, z8i, z85 (1917); 2 TFFaNY, op.
Ct t., pp. 1434, 1435; C. E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH
LAND (1929) p. 153 ct scq.; Town of Stamford v. Vuono, zoS Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 24
(1928).
'The Ohio cases in this area are reviewed in Kokenge v. Whetstone, (C.P.) ii Ohio
Op. 253, z6 Ohio L. Abs. 398 aff'd in 6o Ohio App. 302, 2o N.E. (2d) 965, 54 Ohio Op.
137, 2S Ohio L. Abs. 148, motion to certify overruled April 19, 1939. waiver of the
restrictions was claimed in the Kokcnge case. On appeal, the restriction was upheld for
the reasons: (I) that enforcement was still of substantial value to property owners in the
rubdivision; (z) that the intended purpose of the covenants could still be fulfilledi and
(_) that in equity the restriction created easements on each lot in favor of every other lot
creating the relation of dominant and servient estates.
'The rule in England is that payment must be made to the person otherwise entitled
to enforce the restriction. Re Simeon (1937) Ch. 525, reviewing other cases. The ma-
jority rule in this country seems to be in agreement. Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 6s8, 232
S.W. 1024, 17 A.L.R. 543 (592z); Ladd v. Boston, 15 Mass. g8S, 21 Am. St. Rep. 485,
24 N.E. 858 (I89O); Flynn v. New York, TV. & B. R. Co., 258 N.Y. 140, ii2 N.E. 913,
Ann. Cas. 1913B, 588 (19x6); Johnstone v. G. H. & M. R. Co., 245 Mich. 6S, 222
N.W. 3z5, 67 A.L.R. 373 (1928). Contra, Herr v. Bd. of Education, 8z N.J.L. 61o, 83
At. 173 (ig9z); Doan v. Cleveland Shortline R. Co., 92 Ohio St. 465, In N.E. 505
(i95). Cf., Kueblcr v. Cleveland Short Line Ry Co., 5o Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 385, 20
Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 525 and memorandum opinion by Supreme Court in 84 Ohio St. 463,
95 N.E. 1145 (191).
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dominant estate because of its nature as a property right cannot be taken
without compensation.
It is doubtful if the contract theory employed in the solution of the
problem of the principal case materially affected the result. The same
conclusion could have been reached under an easement theory. Under
either approach, the problem should be resolved on the basis of the in-
tention of the original parties. In a case of this kind, the court will be
influenced not only by the surrounding circumstances and the terms of
the instrument as a whole but also by its feeling as to the reasonableness
of the alternative constructions.'
The occasions where the parties would actually desire to have the
benefit of such a covenant enjoyed independent of the ownership of land
actually affected in value by its enforcement, assuming they had in fact
thought about the question, are probably rare. This fact coupled with
a more or less articulate policy against encumbrances on fee interests in
land9 is enough to lead to a conclusion that the benefit of the restriction
is appurtenant to the dominant land or is for the convenantee only in his
capacity as owner. A different conclusion is justified only when there is
a clear showing that the benefit of the covenant was intended to be in
gross and enforceable regardless of whether the covenantee continues
to own land affected by the enforcement.
Several courts have gone to the length of saying as a rule of law that
the benefit of such a restrictive covenant cannot remain in gross when
the burden is one running with the land.'0 This view is that no action
to enforce a restrictive covenant may be maintained unless some elements
of an equitable servitude are present. The minority position has been
vigorously asserted in an Illinois decision" which has been supported by
eminent authority12 but criticised as well by numerous writers.13 While
the principal case contains language which could be interpreted as as-
suming this point against the plaintiff, the court does not discuss the
problem.' 4 In related fields there has been some tendency to make the
s see note 16, infra.
'See Hitz v. Flower, !O4 Ohio St. 47, 57, 135 N.E. 450 (1922).
" Dana v. Wentworth, ass Mass. 291 (1873); Gaston v. Price, sz Tenn. App. 543
(1931)s Boyd v. Park Realty Corp., 137 Md. 36, i11 Atl. 129 (i9z); Formby v. Bar-
ker (903) 2 Ch. (Eng.) 539. Later English cases have followed the rule with some re-
luctance: see Annotation, 8 Brit. Rul. Cas. 22o (igsg). The New York cases bearing on
the question are discussed in Note (2938) 13 St. John's L. Rev. 93, 98.
'Van Sant v. Rose, 26o Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 186 (1913).
Cf., Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bascroft, 209 Mass. 217, 95 N.E. zs6 (19sIi) and
Bessinett v. White, (gz6) I Dom. L. Rep. 95. The latter is noted in 39 Harv. L. Rev.
(1926) atp. 775-
"Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, IS Col. L.
Rev. 291, 313 (i928).
'Collected in C. E. CLARK, Op. Cit. at pp. 159, s6o.
14 Van Sant v. Rose and Dean (now Justice) Stone's views are cited with approval
in Huber v. Gugliemi, 29 Ohio App. 290, 163 N.E. 571 (1928). See also Burton v.
question of whether the benefit runs turn on a decision as to the running
of the burden. Such a position is undesirable'" either in the field of re-
strictive covenants or of easements and profits. Either in equity or law
there are two distinct problems. Each involves the determination of a
separable intention and distinct considerations of policy.
The result reached in the principal case is believed to fit well into
the general scheme of enforcing restrictive covenants whenever their
social expediency is sufficiently demonstrated.' 6 No substantial reason
was presented for permitting this covenantee to enforce the restriction.
The case does not hold that the benefit of a covenant cannot be in gross.
There may be some situations where such a covenant would be intended
and where it would be desirable. A. N. M.
TORTS
TORTS - DUTY OF BASEBALL CLUBS TO PROVIDE FOR
SAFETY OF PATRONS - ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Plaintiff, familiar with baseball and the ball park, attended a game
at defendant's park on "Ladies' Day." She obtained a seat for ten cents
in the unscreened right pavilion more than one hundred feet from the
batter. She could have obtained a seat in the screened grandstand by
paying an additional twenty-five cents, as there were empty seats there,
but she preferred to sit where she did. She was struck by a foul ball
during the game. Held: that defendant was not liable for her injury.'
Plaintiff was an invitee of the defendant. It is usually said that
an invitor is under a duty to use ordinary care to render the premises
reasonably safe for his invitees.' In actions against baseball clubs, it is
often said that the baseball club has discharged its duty to its invitees if
it provides a screened section adequate to take care of the demands of
the ordinary number of patrons who will desire that extra protection.3
So where a foul ball curved around the screen and struck a patron sitting
Stapth, 4 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 65, 17 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) I, reversed by circuit court in 4 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 73, which was reversed without opinion in 74 Ohio St. 461, 78 N.E. 11zo
(x906).
S 5. E. CLARK, op. Cit., p. 8o et sel. and authorities there collected.
I In determining the validity of a covenant "inquiry should be made concerning the
purpose of the same, the object, design, and reasonableness thereof." Dixon v. Van
Sweringcn Co., Izi Ohio St. 56, 6o, I66 N.E. 887 (1929).
'Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club Co., 6z Ohio App. 514 (1940).
'Harriman v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N.E. 451 (1887); Flynn
v. Central Rr. Co. of New Jersey, 142 N.Y. 439, 37 N.E. 54 (5894).
'Crane v. Kansas Ciky Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 30!, 153 S.W.
1076, 22 A.L.R. 633 (1913)i Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., et al., z5 N.C. 64, 1
S.E. (7d) 131 (1939)-
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